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INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LABOR UNIONS UNDER THE
LABOR REFORM ACT OF 1959*

Archibald Coxt
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
19591 has two main divisions. One deals with the internal
affairs of labor organizations and, incidentally, with certain dishonest practices in labor-management relations tending to corrupt
union officials. The other deals with labor-management relations
as such. This article is confined to the first branch.

T

HE

J.

LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

In the Report of the United States Commission on Industrial
Relations of 1914, John R. Commons wrote:
"It has doubtless appealed to some people who consider the
employer's position more powerful than that of the union,
that the employer should be compelled in some way to deal
with unions, or at least to confer with their representatives.
But if the State recognizes any particular union by requiring
the employer to recognize it, the State must necessarily guarantee the union to the extent that it must strip it of any abuses
it may practice."2
In retrospect it seems plain that the enactment of the LMRDA
became inevitable when Congress, by enacting the Wagner Act,3
not only granted employees the right to bargain collectively but
also transported the political principle of majority rule into labormanagement relations by giving the union designated by the
majority the exclusive right to represent all the employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit. The bargaining representative has
power, in conjunction with the employer, to fix a worker's wages,
hours and conditions of employment without his consent.4 The
employer and individual employee may not lawfully negotiate
• Portions of this article were first delivered as a lecture at the Institute of Industrial
Relations, University of California at Los Angeles.
t Royall Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.-Ed.
lAct of September 14, 1959, Public Law 86-257, 86th Cong., 1st sess.
2 U.S. COMMISSION ON INDUS"rRIAL RELATIONS 374 (1915).
s 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. (1958) §§ 151-168.
4See Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 at 202 (1944), in which Chief
Justice Stone said on behalf of the Court, "Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining
representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to
create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents. . . ."
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terms or conditions of employment.5 As a matter of practice and
probably in legal theory, the union controls the grievance procedure through which contracts are enforced.6 The government
which confers this power upon labor organizations has a duty to
insure that the power is not abused.
The pressure for the actual enactment of such legislation came
from three sources. Since World War II there had been a growing
concern lest some unions, which were plainly instruments of industrial democracy in representing the rights of employees against
employers, become too indifferent to democracy and the rights of
minorities within the organization. One finds evidence of this
school of thought in academic publications7 and the bills offered
by the American Civil Liberties Union.8 Two unions, the Upholsterers' International Union and the United Automobile Workers, reacted by creating impartial appeal boards to review disciplinary action by the international against individual members or a
local union.
Second, the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the
Labor or Management Field, popularly known as the McClellan
Committee, began dramatizing related questions. The committee
was principally concerned with the misuse of union funds by dishonest officers, with illicit profits, violence and racketeering and,
in its later days, with secondary boycotts and organizational picketing but, although its own hearings were frequently marred by disrespect for the rights of the witnesses, the committee also uncovered
shocking evidence of internal misgovernment within a small handful of labor organizations. The disclosures built up pressure for
reform.
The third source of pressure was the National Association of
Manufacturers, the United States Chamber of Commerce and other
employer organizations whose primary object appears to have been
to use the outcry against corruption within labor unions as an
occasion for revising labor-management relations laws in a man5 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944). Cf J. I. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
6 For a recent decision indicating that the union has power to settle grievances, see
Jenkins v. Wm. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., (Md. 1958) 144 A. (2d) 88 (dictum). The
point is discussed at length in Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement," 69 HAR.v. L
REv. 601 (1956).
7 E.g., Aaron and Komaroff, "Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs," 44 ILL.
L. REv. 425, 631 (1949); Summers, "Legal Limitations on Union Discipline," 64 HARv. L.
REv. 1049 (1951).
s Hearings before the House Committee on Education and Labor on Bills to Amend
and Repeal the NLRA, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 3633-3643 (1947).
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ner which would weaken the unions. The business lobbyists sought
incidentally to "toughen" any proposal to regulate the conduct
of unions or their officials even though the measure pertained exclusively to relations between the unions and their own members.
The LMRDA provisions dealing with internal union affairs
stem from bills introduced by Senator Kennedy during the 85th
Congress. The first would have required labor organizations to
file complete financial reports with the Secretary of Labor, which
would be open to public inspection.9 It also sought to bring to
light by reporting all financial holdings or income of union officials
which might create a conflict between their own selfish interests
and unswerving loyalty to union members. The third principal
division of this bill would have limited the power of international unions to suspend local autonomy by trusteeships or receiverships. The Kennedy bill went far beyond the administration's proposal and was strongly attacked by AFL-CIO President
Meany in his testimony before the Senate Labor Committee. Later,
the strong congressional support for the still more stringent measures introduced by Senator Knowland10 convinced the most perceptive leaders of the labor movement that a reform bill was inevitable.
At this stage Senator Kennedy introduced a second bill,11
which would require labor organizations to choose their officials
in periodic elections either by secret ballot or by a convention
of delegates chosen by secret ballot. The bill also laid down a few
basic rules designed to secure every member an opportunity to
vote without coercion or restraint. Enforcement was to be vested
in the Secretary of Labor who was given power to conduct a new
election if the first was proved illegal in a federal court.
The Senate Labor Committee combined these bills with various provisions espoused by Senator McClellan the chief effect
of which was to bar criminals from union office and to make various
offenses against unions into federal crimes.12 The committee also
recommended sweeping provisions requiring employers to report
expenditures for labor relations and recommended minor changes
in the Taft-Hartley Act desired by the labor movement. The latter changes were described as non-controversial because they were
not only supported by Senator Kennedy and the northern DemoS. 3454, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (1958).
3068, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (1958).
3751, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (1958).
12 S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (1958); S. Rep. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (1958)

9

10 S.
11 S.
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crats but also had been recommended by the President and Secretary of Labor and approved by the Senate Labor Committee
under Republican majorities. Senator Ives played a leading role
in developing this measure and securing Republican support.
The Kennedy-Ives bill wai, amended on the Senate floor in some
details but it passed the Senate by a vote of 88 to 1 without substantial change.13 The bill was killed in the House partly as a result
of the combined opposition of business groups and labor unions.14
At the start of the 86th Congress, Senator Kennedy introduced
the Kennedy-Ervin bill, a refurbished version of the Kennedy-Ives
measure.15 The provisions requiring financial reports by employers were substantially narrower than the corresponding sections
of the Kennedy-Ives bill and some of the proposed amendments
to the Taft-Hartley Act were narrowed or omitted. The changes
made by the Labor Committee had the effect of making the regulations more detailed, especially in the title dealing with elections,
but they did not affect the theory or basic subject matter of the
measure.16 The major issues during the floor debate involved TaftHartley amendments which do not concern us here except for the
introduction of a so-called "Bill of Rights" which ultimately became Title I of the LMRDA.17
Sentiment in the House of Representatives coalesced about
three proposals. The first was a mild reform bill sponsored by
Representative Shelley of California and supported by the labor
movement and its most ardent sympathizers.18 In the middle of
the road stood the Elliott bill.19 The Elliott bill was based upon
the bill passed by the Senate but it contained a number of important modifications in the "Bill of Rights" and corrected some
of the details of the Senate version. Its most important contribution, as events proved, was the introduction of a new section declaring the fiduciary duties of union officials and providing a
federal remedy. At the extreme right was the Landrum-Griffin bill
which combined the Senate version of the "Bill of Rights" and the
Elliott proposals on reporting and disclosure, elections, trusteeships and the fiduciary duties of union officials but which substi18 104 CONG. REc. 11487 (1958).
14 104 CoNG. REc. 18260 (1958).
15 S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959).
16 S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959).
17105 CoNG. REc. 5810-5811 (April 22, 1959); 105 CoNG. REc. 6005-6030 (April 25, 1959).
18 H.R. 8490, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959).
19 H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959).
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tuted for the pro-labor Taft-Hartley amendments new restrictions
upon secondary boycotts and organizational picketing.20 The Landrum-Griffin bill also proposed to give the NLRB power to cede
large portions of its jurisdiction to state courts and agencies governed by state law. Ultimately the House adopted the LandrumGriffin proposal21 and a Conference Committee was appointed.
Although there were sharp differences between the House and
Senate conferees upon some details of the proposed regulation of
internal union affairs, the major controversy revolved about issues
of labor-management relations law. After two weeks there was
agreement upon a Conference Report. The report was adopted in
both Houses by overwhelming votes22 and became the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
Thus, the final regulation of internal union affairs came from
several sources. The "Bill of Rights" is a modified version of
Senator McClellan's proposal. The provisions subjecting union
officials to fiduciary duties came from the Elliott bill. The core
of the reporting requirements, the restrictions upon improper
trusteeships and receiverships, and the electoral guarantees as well
as the tightening of the criminal law were derived from the bills
sponsored by Senator Kennedy.

II.

THE FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF UNION OFFICIALS

In equity the large sums of money gathered into the treasuries
of labor organizations belong to the members. The members are
entitled to share in the management and expenditure of their
funds, and to have a periodic accounting. The officers are fiduciaries charged with handling the funds for the benefit, and in
accordance with the instructions, of the members. The McClellan
Committee hearings demonstrated that important union officials
were stealing from the members, chiefly in the International Union
of Operating Engineers, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the United Textile Workers. There could be no dispute
about the desirability of stamping out the thievery and raising
obstacles to its repetition. The only problem was to devise the
most effective methods. The LMRDA pursues three courses of
action.
20 H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959).
21105 CoNG. REc. 14540-14541 (Aug. 14, 1959).
22105 CoNG. REc. 16435 (Sept. 3, 1959); 105 CONG. REc. 16653-16654 (Sept. 4, 1959).
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NEW CRIMINAL OFFENSES

The act creates several new federal crimes involving financial
dishonesty on the part of union officials. Embezzlement of the
funds of a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting
commerce becomes a felony; 23 the willful destruction or falsification of its records is punishable as a misdemeanor.24 Since the
hearings uncovered large "loans" from union treasuries to union
officials, which had not been repaid, the act forbids lending an
officer or member more than $2,000.25 The prohibition may cause
some inconvenience to international representatives transferred to
new locations, for some unions previously lent them the capital
necessary to resettle their families at a low rate of interest, but the
blanket prohibition seems to be the only way to eliminate the use
of loans to conceal embezzlement or to aid a dominant officer who
wants capital for private speculation. In an effort to drive criminals from the labor movement it was also made an offense to
occupy a responsible union position or knowingly to permit one to
occupy such a position within five years after conviction of specified
crimes. 26
B.

REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE

The LMRDA also requires every labor organization in an industry affecting interstate commerce to file an annual financial
report disclosing its receipts and disbursements together with the
sources and purposes thereof. 27 The reports are filed with the Secretary of Labor on forms prescribed by him. They are open to union
members, the press and the general public. A union is required to
preserve the records necessary to verify and substantiate its reports.28 The Secretary of Labor is authorized to investigate the
accuracy of reports armed with the power to subpoena.29 Failure
to file a report or filing an intentionally false report is punishable
by fine or imprisonment.30 The Secretary is also given the rather
unusual power to "report to interested persons or officials concern23 Section

501 (c).
209 (c).
503 (a).
504.
201.
28 Sections 205-206, 209 (c).
29 Section 601.
30 Section 209.
2-1 Section
25 Section
26 Section
27 Section
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ing the facts required to be shown in any report required by this
Act and concerning the reasons for failure or refusal to file such a
report or any other matter which he deems to be appropriate as
a result of such an investigation." 31
This provision seeks to implement the basic theory of the statute - that the government should assure union members adequate
information about the conduct of the union's financial affairs;
that it should guarantee fair elections for the selection of officers;
and that it should then trust the good sense of the members to
remove any incompetent or dishonest officials. The Secretary's
function is to furnish the members with the facts which should
have been supplied by union officials. In legal usage "interested
persons" means not the curious, but those who are substantially
affected. Possibly the section permits an irresponsible Secretary
to injure a union which displeases him by issuing hostile press
releases without a hearing, but this is a power possessed by all
prosecutors or investigators without express statutory authorization.32 The risk is a small price to pay for the safeguard.
It remains to be seen whether the theory of reporting and disclosure will discourage the repetition of past scandals and eliminate honest but careless financial practices. Similar sanctions
have proved sufficiently effective in other contexts to justify their
use before resorting to harsher methods.
The preparation of reports will multiply paper work. The
statute also requires each officer to obtain an individual bond.33
It raises vague dangers of personal liability in the minds of men
31 Section

601 (a).
Glass v. Ickes, (D.C. Cir. 1940) 117 F. (2d) 273.
33 Section 502. The interpretative bulletin issued by the Secretary of Labor rules that
the bonding requirement is satisfied by a position schedule bond, i.e., one which covers
any officials and union agents holding specified positions without naming the particular
individuals. 29 C.F.R. §453.18 (Supp. 1960). This interpretation may well be a proper
reading of statutory language. It appears to be buttressed by usage in the insurance field.
It is quite plain, however, that many of the House and Senate conferees believed that
§502 did not permit position schedule bonds but required either individual bonds or name
schedule bonds. Senators Kennedy, Morse, McNamara and Randolph strenuously objected
to this requirement. The conference accepted it by a majority vote only after protracted
argument when it became apparent that the House view would have to be accepted if the
conferees were to agree upon a report. Senator Morse opposed the conference report upon
this ground among others. See 105 CoNG. REc. 16388 (Sept. 3, 1959).
In the same regulation the Secretary of Labor construes §502 to require that union officials be bonded only for the proper handling of union funds. Although the bonding
companies have suggested that §502 may be somewhat broader in scope, it seems quite
plain that this interpretation not only conforms to the language of the statute but also
carries out the intention of all the members of the conference committees.
82
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to whom legal proceedings are unfamiliar. Local union offices
carry no pay and little honor. Thus the statute may make it harder
to fill the necessary offices. Compliance with the bonding and
reporting requirements will entail considerable expense. The
easiest way for the international unions to meet these problems is
to merge a number of locals into a single unit, a trend which was
evident before the LMRDA was enacted. Since there was no evidence of past misconduct and little temptation to dishonesty in such
cases, the Senate sought to minimize the problem by creating a
revocable exemption for truly small unions, 34 but the coalition of
Republic,£ns and Southern Democrats insisted upon deleting the
exemption in order to "toughen" the bill. Fortunately, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to provide a simplifie~ form of report
for small locals and his initial regulations appear well suited to
minimizing the burden.35
More disturbing than the outright thievery revealed by the
McClellan Committee was the evidence of the use of union office
for personal profit; for one suspects that the vice of playing both
sides of the street, under-cover deals, and conflicts of interest infect
a good many unions whose officials believe themselves to be personally honest. Two illustrations reported by the committee deserve mention. About 1950, according to the i:eport, Peter W.
Weber, business manager of Local 825 of the International Union
of Operating Engineers, secured a twelve percent interest in Public Constructors, Inc., in exchange for a loan of $2,500. Public
Constructors did business within the territorial jurisdiction of
Local 825 and had collective bargaining agreements with that
union. In negotiating and administering these contracts Weber's
personal financial interests stood in direct conflict with unselfish
devotion to the welfare of the employees. By 1959 the book value
of his business interest had increased almost fifty-fold its cost to $108,677.36 Other evidence before the committee tended to
show that James Hoffa held interests in firms with which the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters bargained.37
Such conduct, if it occurred as reported, offends ancient moral
precepts. The common law has condemned it for generations.
AFL-CIO Ethical Practices Code IV states:
34 S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st sess., §201 (d) (1959), as passed by Senate.
35 Section 208. 24 Fed. Reg. 9931, 10105 (1959). The regulation will appear

at 29 C.F.R.
§§403.1 to 403.10.
36 S. Hearings Before the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or
Management Field, 85th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 20, 8134-8140 (1958).
37 Id., 85th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 13, 5038 (1957).
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"
a basic ethical principle in the conduct of trade union
affairs is that no responsible trade union official should have
a personal financial interest which conflicts with the full performance of his fiduciary duties as a workers' representative."
The code then condemns a number of specific practices illustrating the basic principle - loans by a union to an officer, owning an interest in a business with which the union bargains or an
enterprise which is in competition with such a business, and owning
an interest in an enterprise a substantial part of which consists of
buying from, selling to, or otherwise dealing with a business with
which the union bargains.
Unfortunately the AFL-CIO lacks power to implement the code
except by expelling an entire international union. It has no
method of gathering evidence. It cannot proceed against individuals. In many cases the sanction of expulsion would be too severe;
in others too harmful to the labor movement.
The original Kennedy bills sought to support the underlying
moral precepts by requiring every union officer annually to report
to the Secretary of Labor any holdings, income or transactions
which created a potential conflict between his personal interests
and loyalty to the members.38 These sections, which reach not
only cases where the official has legal title, but also beneficial ownership held through "covers," "straws" or "blinds," were carried
into the LMRDA without amendment. 39 True criminals will undoubtedly ignore the duty to report but the detailed and unequivocal legislative condemnation of specific holdings and transactions
should go far toward establishing a higher standard of conduct.
The official whose fingers itch for a "fast buck" but who is not a
criminal will be deterred by the fear of prosecution if he files no
report and by fear of reprisal from the members if he does.
C.

FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS

Despite the scarcity of direct precedent, it seems plain that
all union officers and employees have always been subject to the
usual common-law fiduciary duties of an agent. 40 Violations are
redressible in the state courts. The duty is so seldom enforced,
38 S. 3454, 85th Cong., 2d sess., §102 (1958).
39 Section 202.
40 Union officers are obviously agents. All true agents owe fiduciary
principals. AGENCY R.EsTATEMENT SECOND §§387-398 (1958). Curiously,

obligations to their
there appear to be
only two judicial opinions which set forth the rule. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 26 N.Y.S. (2d) 345
(1941); Tinkler v. Powell, 23 Wyo. 352, 151 P. 1097 (1915).
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however, that the House Labor ·committee adopted, and the
Senate approved, an amendment giving it a federal statutory base.
Section 501 (a) states in general terms the union agent's obligation
to act solely for the benefit of his principal, to be loyal, to refrain from competing with his principal or acquiring conflicting
interests and "to account . . . for any profit received by him in
whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by
him or under his direction." The principles stated in section
501 (a) were drawn from the Restatement of Agency in an effort to
incorporate the whole body of common law precedents defining
the fiduciary obligations of agents and trustees41 with such adaptations as might be required to take into account "the special problems and functions of a labor organization .... " 42
Section 50 I (b) authorizes any union member to bring a suit
in the federal court in the nature of a minority stockholder's
bill whenever his union refuses to sue an officer or employee
alleged to be guilty of a breach of fiduciary obligations. The trial
judge may allot part of any sums recovered for counsel fees and
expenses. All the usual remedies for breach of trust are available.43
These provisions are potentially among the most important
in the LMRDA. If individual members have the initiative and interest to bring suit, the Becks, Hoffas and Webers may be required
to account not only for alleged misappropriations but also for all
the profits which they may have made by virtue of their offices.
If the findings of the McClellan Committee were sustained in
court, equity would impose a trust for the benefit of the Operating
Engineers upon Weber's stock in Public Constructors; Beck would
be required to account for the moneys or gifts allegedly received
from Nathan Shefferman; and, if Hoffa received loans from the
Teamsters, he might well be required to account not only for the
money but also for any proceeds of his investment.
Section 50 I imposes no restrictions upon the purposes for
which a labor organization may expend its funds. The propriety
of union activities other than collective bargaining, such as charitable contributions and support for political candidates, may
be fairly debatable but this is a separate issue of too great importance for the courts to resolve by interpreting a provision
which deals directly with only the duties of union agents to the
§§387, 388, 389 and 394 (1958).
501 (a).
501 (b) provides that the action may be brought to "recover damages or
secure an accounting or other appropriate relief."
41 See AGENCY REsrATEMENT SECOND

42 Section
43 Section
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organization and its members. Read in their context the words are
plain; it is made the duty of the union officers and agents "to
manage, invest, and expend ... [the union's money and property]
in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions
of the governing bodies adopted thereunder." An agent who follows the instructions of his principal is not guilty of a breach of
fiduciary duties. Section 501 emphasizes the importance of giving
careful attention to the constitutional provisions and resolutions
of governing bodies but where the union grants the necessary
authority, no statutory restriction is imposed. If there were ambiguity it would be dispelled by the statement of five members
of the House Labor Committee in reporting the committee bill, for
they were the five who sponsored the bill and they included Congressman O'Hara, who proposed section 50 I in the Labor Committee.44 Senator Kennedy gave a similar explanation in presenting the Conference Report. 45
Ill.

INTERNAL UNION DEMOCRACY

In a rudimentary modern political sense democracy implies
(a) control of governing decisions by those affected and (b) a
decent respect for the fundamental rights of individuals and minorities, not only by the individuals in power but also by the
ruling majority. No politician dares publicly to question the
value of democracy in the government of labor organizations but
among academicians there is quiet and serious debate. According
to one view, labor unions should be regarded as military organizations, for their function is to wage economic warfare with employers who are constantly feeling out chinks in the unions' defenses
through which to wound, if not destroy, them. As a wartime army
can neither brook divided leadership nor tolerate active dissidents so must a union punish the trouble-makers in order to close
ranks against employers and rival organizations. The sophisticated
exponents of this view also contend that since union officials have
better training and more experience than rank and file members,
those officials who are given the power will act more responsibly
in enforcing the union's obligations to employers, will present
fewer preposterous or impractical demands and, if allowed the
power, will enforce their decisions. Professor John T. Dunlop
warns us:
« H. Rep. 741, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 81-82 (1959).

45 105 CONG. R.Ec. 16540

(Sept. 3, 1959).
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"Already we are seeing employers who urged Congress to pass
'strong legislation' affecting internal union government going
to national union officers as of old seeking national union support to restrain the demands of locals and to make agreements.
They are not likely to get as much cooperation; they could not
be given as much. The country has chosen on the grounds of
morality and democracy to make wage stability more difficult
to achieve."
The advocates of this position hope to improve union government by creating a sense of professional responsibility among union
officials. Perhaps the partial professionalization of management is
an encouraging precedent.
But the argument is hardly persuasive. An autocratic union
may serve the material demands of its members by bargaining
effectively for higher wages and increased benefits. It may establish a measure of job security. None except a democratic union,
however, can achieve the idealistic aspirations which justify labor
organizations. Collective bargaining may limit the employer's
power by substituting a negotiated agreement for arbitrary tyranny
of the boss, but it scarcely extends the rule of law to substitute an
autocratic union. Only in a democratic union can workers,
through chosen representatives, participate jointly with management in the government of their industrial lives even as all of us
may participate, through elected representatives, in political government.
The state alone cannot achieve true union democracy but it
has much to contribute. Preserving democracy requires protecting individuals and minorities against numerical majorities
or an officialdom which acts with the majority's consent. It is
not enough to put our trust in self-restraint. The task of assuring workers the ultimate control of the affairs of their unions
should be undertaken by law because it is the law which gives a
union, as bargaining representative, the quasi-legislative power
to bind employees in the bargaining unit without their consent.
Half a century ago unions were too fragile to survive internal
dissension, but surely no one seriously doubts the current ability
of the major labor organizations to survive free elections, free
debate and a decent respect for minorities among the members.
To show that union officials have a better grasp of economic
policy than the rank and file and a higher sense of obligation does
not demonstrate the wisdom of aristocratic government in labor
relations for the same reasons that the parallel argument fails in
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relation to the government of nations. Leadership is required, but
it should be achieved by the arts of the statesman and not the easy
road of compulsion with its denials of opportunity and temptations
to tyranny and sloth. The proper balance between control by the
membership and the executive direction necessary to effective
action cannot be achieved by general debate about the desirability
of democracy; it involves specific questions concerning the disposition of power and the frequency of elections.46
A.

The Bill of Rights for Union Members

Although the bill sponsored by the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare protected many of the interests of
union members, its provisions concentrated upon specific areas
in which abuses had occurred and for which existing remedies
appeared inadequate - the handling of funds, conflicts of interest,
union elections, international trusteeships and racketeering. Senator Kennedy and his advisers were acutely aware of what they
de~med the risks of destroying self-government within the labor
unions.
"Trade unions have made a commendable effort to correct
internal abuses; hence the committee believes that only essential standards should be imposed by legislation. Moreover, in
establishing and enforcing statutory standards great care
should be taken not to undermine union self-government or
weaken unions in their role as collective-bargaining agents." 47
There were others who did not share this concern. On the
Senate floor Senator McClellan, who had introduced bills to establish a system of union registration and prescribe the terms of
union constitutions and by-laws, sponsored an amendment to create
a "bill of rights" for union members. 48 The amendment contained
sweeping guarantees in absolute terms of freedom of speech and
assembly, and of "equal rights and privileges" in voting, participation at meetings and the handling of grievances. There were tight
restrictions upon increases in union dues. The expulsion of a member was prohibited unless there was a verbatim stenographic transcript of the trial and review by an outsider. Members' rights were
made enforceable by a suit for an injunction. Willful violations
were made felonies.
46 See pp. 842-845 infra.
47 S. Rep. 187, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 7 (1959).
48 105 ':°NG. REc. 5810-5811 (April 22, 1959).
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The sponsors of the amendment may have counted upon cautious judicial interpretation to qualify its vague and sweeping
absolutes much as the constitutional Bill of Rights is tempered by
judicial decisions; and possibly they were right. The critics
doubted whether even the Supreme Court would interpret statutory restrictions upon a labor union in the same fashion as constitutional limitations upon the Congress. They feared that inferior courts, many of the judges being extremely hostile to unions,
would give the sweeping phrases their fullest, literal meaning. In
any event, it seemed extremely unfair to ask a union official to
accept such risks as presiding over a meeting under threat of conviction for a felony if one of his rulings was later held to deny a
member freedom of speech.
Other provisions seemed impractical, especially the guaranty
of "equal rights and privileges" in every phase of union activity.
Workers are constantly complaining that management and union
officials have mishandled their grievances and some form of safeguard is desirable.49 The McClellan bill of rights seemed to provide that such complaints should be investigated by the Secretary
of Labor whenever it was alleged that the union failed to grant
"equal rights and privileges," thus transferring the grievance from
the shop floor to governmental channels. Again, fairness sometimes
requires differentiations within the ranks of union members. Many
local unions have a mixed membership. A local of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, for example, may include construction workers and also members from a power company or a manufacturing concern. If the business on the agenda
were whether to go on strike or ratify a proposed contract covering
electrical construction, it would seem reasonable to bar the industrial members from the vote. If a local industrial union had members from four non-competitive factories whose employees composed four bargaining units, it might be reasonable to provide in
the by-laws that only the members employed at a particular company should vote upon items of business confined to that bargaining unit. To outlaw such by-laws seemed unnecessarily to curtail
the opportunities of self-determination.
The Senate adopted the McClellan amendment by a vote of 47
to 46,150 but strong sentiment for modification immediately sprang
49 For comprehensive discussions of this problem, see Report of the Committee on
Improvement of the Administration of Union-Employer Contracts, ABA, SEcnoN OF LAlloR
RELATIONS LAw PROC. 33 (1954); Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement,'' 69 HARv. L.
REv. 601 (1956).
.
50 105 CONG. REc. 5827 (April 22, 1959).
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up not only among its opponents but also in the ranks of Southern
supporters who came to realize that the authorization of governmental suits for injunctions to enforce private rights would be an
embarrassing precedent in future debates over civil rights legislation. During the next two days a compromise was drafted. Many
groups had to be consulted and since the Senate had proceeded to
other sections of the bill the work was done late at night or in little
knots upon the Senate floor. The draftsmanship left much to be
desired, perhaps because of the haste and stress, the number of
participants, and the priority of tactical acceptability over nicety
of expression. The Senate approved the compromise by an overwhelming vote.151
Legislative tactics also triumphed over sound draftsmanship in
the House of Representatives. The draftsman of the LandrumGriffin bill incorporated the bill of rights passed by the Senate because its sponsors had instructed him not to write any original provisions. The Landrum-Griffin bill was approved upon the House
floor without prior consideration in committee. Since there were
no differences between the Senate and House bills in this respect,
under parliamentary law the conferees were powerless to revise the
bill of rights. Thus, these sections never received the careful
technical review and clarification which comes from scrutiny by a
congressional committee and its legislative staff.

Participation in Union Affairs. Section 101 (a) (I) of the
LMRDA guarantees all union members "equal rights and privileges" in nominating candidates and voting in union elections, in
attending union meetings, and in discussing and voting upon union
affairs, all "subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such
organization's constitution and bylaws." The qualification is the
result of the accommodation between the practicalities of union
government and the commendable aim of preventing unjust discrimination between union members. Time and litigation will
be required to determine what are "reasonable rules and regulations," but the basic distinction is not hard to illustrate. The
division of members into voting and non-voting classes exemplified
by the prior practice of the Operating Engineers is contrary to section 101 (a). On the other hand, in local unions with a mixed
membership it would be reasonable, as shown above, to limit the
voting upon specific issues to those who are directly concerned.
151105

CoNG.

REc. 6030 (April 25, 1959).
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Discrimination against apprentices is probably unreasonable,
although the distinction has the possible justification that they are
usually less mature than journeymen members while they are learning the trade. The Culinary Workers, Barbers, and other unions
which admit employers to membership will probably have to
choose, when subject to the act, between granting employers the
right to participate in meetings, which has heretofore been denied,
and surrendering this method of subjecting employers to the
union's rules·. The principle underlying section 101 (a) (I) is that
those who are bound, as members, by the union's decisions should
have the opportunity to take part in the deliberations. All members are plainly entitled to vote in union elections for the statutory
right of each member to cast one vote cannot be qualified by even
a reasonable rule.52
Some unions allow retired employees and workers who have
left the trade or industry to retain their cards as non-voting- in.embers. Surely this is reasonable in substance, but the technical doubt
could be minimized by constitutional amendments establishing a
special category of members emeriti who, like retired professors,
would retain the dignity and social status of members but lose their
rights and duties.
Section 101 (a) (I) may also help to check the use of violence to
suppress dissent, which every student of union government knows
to occur even though he cannot document the assertion. To evict
a dissident from a meeting would violate section 101 (a) (I) unless
he violated normal rules of decorum. Interference with a critic's
right to speak, offer motions and vote would also be unlawful.

Freedom of Speech and Assembly. Section 101 (a) (2) carries
the legal protection of dissent a step farther by guaranteeing union
members freedom of speech both inside and outside union meetings, and also by securing the critics an opportunity to meet for the
purpose of organizing their opposition. The latter privilege would
seem essential to the formation of effective minorities even though
it flies in the face of traditional trade union opposition to any form
of caucus or separate assemblage. However, dissent in a union, like
treason within a nation, must be suppressed if the purpose is to
52 Section 401 (e). The Secretary of Labor has ruled that the proviso to §101 (a) (1)
qualifies §401 (e) apparently upon the theory that this interpretation is necessary to avoid
inconsistency. But the specific provision is §401 (e) which deals with voting in elections,
and under the normal rules of statutory interpretation the specific provision should control.
The Secretary has also ruled, contrary to the text above, that apprentices may be denied
the right to vote. 29 C.F.R. §452.10 (Supp. 1960). Since the Secretary is in charge of all
proceedings to enforce the elections requirements these interpretations will control.
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destroy the union, encourage a rival, or bring about the violation of
legal or contractual obligations. Section 101 (a) (2) contains an
exception for these cases.

Dues and Assessments. Section 101 (a) (3) prohibits a local
union from increasing its dues or assessments except by a secret
vote of the members in a referendum or a meeting called for the
purpose. An international union may make an increase at a convention or by a referendum of the members and, for the period
before the next convention, by vote of the executive board or similar governing body. The only serious question raised by this provision concerns the manner of raising the payments due the international union in situations where the member pays all his dues
to the local union and the local pays a per capita tax to the international. Since there is no evidence of an intention to affect the
ability of unions to raise money or to regulate the allocation of
power between local and international unions, section 101 (a) (3)
should be read as a specification of the forms through which each
body should express its will when the union constitution requires
its action, without affecting other aspects of the process. An international could therefore raise the per capita tax by any of the
statutory methods without the assent of the local union, but the
local would decide whether to increase the share of the dues paid
to the international or actually raise the dues.
Disciplinary Procedure. Although the rules were originally
formulated in cases involving religious organizations, social clubs,
and somewhat later, fraternal benefit associations, the courts
evolved satisfactory rules applicable to the expulsion of union
members long prior to enactment of the LMRDA. Upon the
theory that improper expulsion violates the member's interest
in the organization's property or a contract between him and other
members made up of the constitution and by-laws or, in recent
years, upon the ground that there is a tortious interference with an
advantageous relationship, the state will set an expulsion aside
upon any of five grounds:
(I) The procedure violated the union's constitution or
by-laws.53
53 Harris v. National Union of Marine Cooks, 98 Cal. App. (2d) 733, 221 P. (2d) 136
(1950); Walsh v. Reardon, 274 Mass. 530, 174 N.E. 912 (1931); Howland v. Local 306,
UAW·CIO, 323 Mich. 305, 35 N.W. (2d) 166 (1948); Savard v. Industrial Trades Union of
America, 76 R.I. 496, 72 A. (2d) 660 (1950).
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(2) The constitution or by-laws did not authorize expulsion for the alleged offense.54
(3) The procedure, although it conformed to the union's
constitution and by-laws, did not afford the member a fair
hearing.55
(4) The expulsion, although it was authorized by the
union's constitution and by-laws, was "unreasonable," contrary to "public policy," or contrary to "natural justice."56
(5) The expulsion was in bad faith because the purported
ground was only a pretense for getting rid of a troublesome
member.57
The rule invalidating expulsion without a hearing requires
observance of much the same minimum safeguards as the due
process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has been
held to impose upon the adjudicative procedures of the state and
federal governments. The accused member must be given an opportunity to hear the charge,58 to present evidence in his defense,59
and to confront and probably to cross-examine the witnesses against
him.60 Any special trial body may not include his accusers,61 but
presumably a trial may be held before the full membership. It
seems unlikely that the accused member is entitled to the aid of a
lawyer in his defense. The accused is entitled to be put upon a
roughly equal footing with the prosecutors. If they are laymen,
surely he is entitled to no more professional assistance. Although
54 Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 P. 217 (1888).
55 Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N.Y.S. 1 (1919). Contra, State ex rel. Dame
v. Le Fevre, 251 Wis. 146, 28 N.W. (2d) 349 (1947).
56 See Swaine v. Miller, 72 Mo. App. 444 at 446 (1897); Spayd v. Ringing Roel< Lodge
No. 665, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 270 Pa. 67, 113 A. 70 (1921); Chafee, "The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit," 43 HARV. L. Rl!.v. 993 at 1015-1018 (1930).
Cf. Dawkins v. Antrobus, [1881] 44 L.T.R. (n.s.) 557 at 559-560 (dictum).
57 Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 P. 217 (1888); Fleming v. Moving
Picture Mach. Operators, 16 N.J. Misc. 502, I A. (2d) 850 (1938), affd. 124 N.J. Eq. 269, 1
A. (2d) 386 (1938); Kuzych v. White, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 187. Cf. Eschman v. Huebner, 226
Ill. App. 537 (1922).
58Armant v. Cannon Employees, (Cal. Super. 1942) 11 L.R.R.M. 752 (member not
informed of evidence against him); "\'\'alsh v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees, 22 N.J. Misc. 161, 37 A. (2d) 667 (1944) (charge too vague); Bartone v. Di Pietro,
18 N.Y.S. (2d) 178 (1939) (no notice of nature of charge).
-59 Cotton Jammers' and Longshoremen's Assn. v. Taylor, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 367, 56
S.W. 553 (1900) (alternative holding).
60 Armant v. Cannon Employees, (Cal. Super. 1942) 11 L.R.R.M. 752; Brooks v. Engar,
259 App. Div. 333, 19 N.Y.S. (2d) 114, appeal dismissed mem., 284 N.Y. 767, 31 N.E. (2d)
514 (1940); Fales v. Musicians' Protective Union, 40 RJ. 34, 99 A. 823 (1917).
61 Gaestel v. Brotherhood of Painters, 120 N .J. Eq. 358, 185 A. 36 (1936); Coleman v.
O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S. (2d) 812 (1945) (alternative holding), appeal dismissed as moot mem.,
269 App. Div. 972, 58 N.Y.S. (2d) 358 (1945). Cf. Cohen v. Rosenburg, 252 App. Div. 274,
27 N.Y.S. (2d) 834 (1941), affd. per curiam, 287 N.Y. 800, 40 N.E. (2d) 1018 (1942).
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the union officers, who are likely to be behind the prosecutors, are
usually more skilled than ordinary members in the rules of procedure, turning a trial over to professional advocates would entail
disproportionate loss in self-government.
The common law grew more slowly in picking out the line
between permissible grounds of expulsion and grounds which are
inadequate despite the authority in the constitution or by-laws.
A member may be expelled for strike-breaking,62 for working at
wages below the union scale, 63 or for aiding an employer to obtain
an injunction against a strike.64 But a member of a licensing board
cannot be lawfully expelled by his union because his officials displease it, 65 nor may a union expel a member for testifying against
it under oath in an arbitration proceeding. 66 The familiar provision in union constitutions which states that bringing suit against
the union is cause for expulsion is plainly invalid. 67 There is a nice
factual line to be drawn between legitimate criticism, which as an
exercise of the privilege of free speech will not justify expulsion,
and stirring up dissension within the union, which is a justification.68 The most difficult issues involve the right of a union to
control its members' activities in fields outside the sphere of collective bargaining but vitally important to the welfare of its members.69
The LMRDA deals with union membership haphazardly. Section 101 (a) (5) incorporates into the federal statute the existing
common law prohibiting the suspension or discipline of a union
member except for nonpayment of dues "unless such member has
62 Becker v. Calnan, 313 Mass. 625, 48 N.E. (2d) 668 (1943); Havens v. King, 221 App.
Div. 475, 224 N.Y.S. 193 (1927), affd. per curiam sub nom. Havens v. Dodge, 250 N.Y. 617,
166 N.E. 346 (1929).
63 Cf. O'Keefe v. Local 463, United Assn. of Plumbers, 277 N.Y. 300, 14 N.E. (2d) 77
(1938); Schmidt v. Rosenburg, 49 N.Y.S. (2d) 364 (1944), affd. mem. 269 App. Div. 685, 54
N.Y.S. (2d) 379 (1945).
64 Burke v. Monumental Div., No. 52, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, (D.C.
Md. 1922) 286 F. 949, affd. per curiam, (4th Cir. 1924) 298 F. 1019, revd. per curiam on
other grounds, 270 U.S. 629 (1926).
65 Schneider v. Local 60, United Assn. Journeymen Plumbers, 116 La. 270, 40 S. 700
(1905).
66 Cf. Angrisani v. Stearn, 167 Misc. 731, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 701 (1938), affd. mem. 255
App. Div. 975, 8 N.Y.S. (2d) 997 (1938); Thompson v. Grand Intl. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 176, 91 S.W. 834 (1905); Link-Belt Speeder Corp., 2
Lab. Arb. Rep. 338 (1945).
67 Burke v. Monumental Div., No. 52 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, (D.C.
Md. 1919) 273 F. 707. See Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40 at 69 (1947) Gackson, J.,
dissenting).
68 See Summers, "Legal Limitations on Union Discipline," 64 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1049 at
1069-1071, 1074 (1951).
~9 See Cox, I.Aw AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 106-111 (1960).
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been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing." Section 101 (a) (4) probably forbids discipline for bringing
suit against a union.70 Section 609 forbids punishing a member
"for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this Act."
No useful purpose is served by these provisions, unless it is to
publicize the availability of remedies. Section 101 (a) (5) merely
incorporates the common-law test of a fair hearing. No additional
substantive law was required, and none was created. The need was
for a more practical remedy than suit by an individual employee.
Congress failed to provide one. Since the federal provisions do not
exclude state law,71 their principal consequence will be to increase
litigation in the federal courts. Violations of the federal statute are
actionable in the district courts of the United States.72 In all other
cases improper discipline will give rise to a state cause of action,
precisely as in the past. There is no merit to the argument that the
federal right is exclusive.73 One telling criticism of the McClellan
bill of rights was that its haphazard guarantee of some rights would
disturb the more complete safeguards under state judicial decisions.74 The saving clause preserving all the "rights and remedies
of any member of a labor organization under any State or Federal
law or before any court or other tribunal" 75 was inserted to meet
this criticism. The obvious intent is to allow the members to enjoy
the benefit of the most favorable rule.
In some situations the member may be in a position to allege
facts giving rise to both federal and state causes of action. Both
could be entertained by a state court. The jurisdictional problem
is more difficult if the action is brought in the federal court,
especially if the federal cause of action fails, for it might be argued
in the absence of diversity of citizenship that the federal court lacks
power to adjudicate the state cause of action. Probably the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would save the plaintiff's case. The
two causes of action are bound to be closely related. Much the same
proof would be material under both. The relief sought would
nearly always be the same.76
70 See pp. 839-841

infra.
103.
72 Section 102.
73 But see Hickey, "The Bill of Rights of Union Members," 48 GEO. L.J. 226 (1959).
74 105 CONG. REc. 5816-5822 (April 22, 1959).
75 Section 103.
76 For a discussion of pendent jurisdiction, see HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 797-809 (1953).
71 Section
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Right To Sue. At common law the rights of individual members can be enforced only by individual suits; the initiative and
costs necessary for prosecution must come from the member. The
LMRDA preserves this condition except that the election and
trusteeship titles are enforceable by the Secretary of Labor upon
the complaint of a member.77 Section 101 (a) (4) grants additional
protection for this right, but its meaning is obscure because the
draftsman also failed to distinguish two radically different kinds
of limitations upon a union member's freedom to sue the organization.
One limitation is the familiar provision in union constitutions
which declares that bringing suit against the union is cause for expulsion unless the member has exhausted his internal remedies. 78
This restriction is against public policy. No private organization
should be permitted to restrict any person's access to courts of
justice. The right should be as absolute as the right to appear in
court as a witness, to petition on a legislature, or to communicate
with a member of Congress.
A quite different kind of limitation is imposed by the judicial
doctrine that a court will not entertain a member's action against
a labor organization until he has exhausted all adequate remedies
within the organization. The rule is one of judicial administration.
It applies not only to suits involving the internal affairs of all forms
of voluntary association,79 but also to actions upon ordinary contracts, including collective bargaining agreements.80 In an exaggerated form the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine may deny legal
relief to a plaintiff whose internal remedy is vain, too slow or too
expensive, but when wisely administered, the doctrine strengthens
the independence and self-government of private associations.
Courts and administrative agencies should not interfere in the
internal affairs of labor organizations, if union democracy is our
goal, until the organization has had a reasonable opportunity to
correct any mistakes of subordinate bodies.
It is not clear whether section 101 (a) (4) affects both limitations upon suits by union members, or only the first, leaving the
courts free to apply the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine wherever
appropriate. The sponsors of the bill of rights and other amend77 Sections 304 and 402.
78 E.g., Constitution of International

Union of United Mine Workers of America, effective November 1, 1948, art. IX.
79 7 C.J.S., Associations §34 {b) (1937).
80 The labor cases are collected in Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement," 69 HARv.
L. REv. 601 at 647-649 (1956).
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ments adopted on the floor of the Senate were much less concerned with encouraging democratic self-government than the
supporters of the original Kennedy bills. Some of the conferees
were not sympathetic to the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine. The
proviso permitting a union to require a man to exhaust internal
remedies available within four months is more appropriately linked
with the judicial doctrine than with restrictions imposed by the
union itself. There are, however, a number of persuasive reasons
for concluding that section 101 (a) (4) should not be construed to
interfere with the exhaustion-of-remedies rule.
(a) The words of section 101 (a) (4) literally refer only to
limitations imposed by a labor union, not to judicial rules of decision. "No labor organization shall limit the right of any member
thereof to institute an action in any court...." 81 The full text
confirms the literal reading. It obviously refers to union rules and
union discipline interfering with the rights to testify and petition
the legislature. The guaranty of the right to sue is expressed in the
same terms.
(b) The exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine applies in the state
courts no less than federal forums. Section 101 (a) (4) also applies
to state proceedings no less than federal, whatever may be the
proper interpretation. It seems unlikely that Congress would so
lightly sweep aside state rules of judicial administration.
(c) The broad interpretation would give section 101 (a) (4) a
curious backlash. If it regulates the legal proceedings brought by
individual members by abolishing the exhaustion-of-remedies
doctrine whenever the delay would exceed four months, must it
not also regulate such proceedings by allowing unions to require
the exhaustion of any remedies which consume less than four
months? If so, a labor union may now require a member to resort
to proceedings within the union before filing charges under the
NLRA. There was no such doctrine in the past.
(d) Reading section 101 (a) (4) to interfere with judicial and
administrative rules of decision creates still other perplexities. It
applies to all suits by union members regardless of the identity of
the defendant. Does it therefore overturn the rule that an employee may not sue an employer to enforce a collective bargaining
agreement until he has exhausted the grievance procedure? Some
labor contracts stipulate that no individual employee shall be
81

Emphasis supplied.
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entitled to any right or remedy outside the grievance procedure.
In other cases unions negotiate adjustments intended to bind
the grievants. To extend section 101 (a) (4) into these areas would
greatly interfere with collective bargaining in ways which Congress
never considered. 82 Under the narrower interpretation the damage
would not be done, but the provision would still serve a useful
and necessary purpose as a guarantee against restrictions imposed
by union rules.
The legislative history gives little guidance. Senator Kennedy's
exposition of the Conference Report just before the Senate vote
espoused the narrower interpretation,83 but some of the House conferees undoubtedly hoped that the broader construction would
prevail. The ambiguity is traceable partly to this difference of
opinion but primarily to the hasty manner in which the compromise bill of rights was prepared.

Admission to Union Membership. The most glaring defect
in the common-law rights of employees vis-a-vis their representative
for the purpose of collective bargaining was the want of legal
remedies for unfair or discriminatory denials of membership. It
is a black-letter rule that no one has a legally-protected right to become a member of a voluntary association.84 Consequently, a union
may exclude an applicant for any reason, good or bad, or for no
reason. It may even discriminate upon grounds of race, color, sex
or religion.
Until recently there was reason to hope that the courts might
gradually change the rule applicable to labor unions. Its repetition
gives it a stronger ring of authority than the direct precedents
warrant. Union membership rarely involves the close personal
association which must have influenced the courts in their refusal
to compel social clubs to admit unwanted members, nor does eligibility tum upon the theological niceties pertinent to religious
organizations. Unions exercise powers under the National Labor
Relations and Railway Labor Acts which are greater than the
power of other voluntary associations - much greater indeed than
the powers which unions exercised prior to the legislation. Since
82 Powell, "The Bill of Rights-Its Impact Upon Employers," 48 GEO. L.J. 270 at 271273 (1959). For a more general discussion, see Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement,''
69 HARV. L. REv. 601 (1956).
83 105 CoNG. REc. 16414 (Sept. 4, 1959).
84 87 C.J .S., Trade Unions §33 (1954). But the modern view denies a union the privilege of enforcing closed-shop contracts against those to whom it has arbitrarily denied
admission. See James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. (2d) 721, 155 P. (2d) 329 (1944).
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union membership is correspondingly more important, this factor
was ample ground for distinguishing the earlier cases and recognizing a legally-protected interest in a fair opportunity to become
a member of the union which acts as the bargaining representative
of the unit in which the applicant is employed.85 It was also possible to argue that performance of the representative's duty of
fair representation requires admitting all members of the bargaining unit to union membership, in the absence of proper cause
for exclusion, because membership is the best assurance that the
employee's voice will be heard and his interests be represented.
Unfortunately, the decision in Ross v. Ebert,86 and the Supreme
Court's refusal to review the Oliphant case87 have discouraged, if
not permanently foreclosed, this avenue of progress.
The LMRDA "bill of rights" does nothing to correct the evil.
The prospect for new federal legislation is also dim. Unions oppose
giving legal remedies for the unfair or discriminatory denial of
membership partly because of a belief that absolute freedom to
select members is the right of a voluntary association and partly
upon the practical ground that forced integration would prevent
the unionization of southern workers. Congressmen from the
southern states oppose such legislation as part of the battle over
segregation.
As a practical matter, therefore, protection of the public interest
in affording employees an opportunity to participate in the affairs
of the unions which represent them rests in the hands of the labor
movement. If the AFL-CIO would take stronger measures to press
its affiliates to conform to its constitutional provisions against discrimination,88 it might well find that the gains from a revival of
conscience offset any immediate practical loss.
B.

Union Elections

The election of officers is the heart of union democracy. The
policies of any large organization must be formulated and administered by a small group of officials. Their responsiveness to the
members depends upon the frequency of elections, a fair opporss cf. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35 at 37, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 882 (1941), modified 263
App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S. (2d) 849 (1941); Raevsky v. Upholsterers' Intl. Union, 38 Pa. D. & C.
187 at 195 (1940).
86 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W. (2d) 315 (1957).
87 Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, (N.D. Ohio 1957) 156 F. Supp. 89,
cert. den. 355 U.S. 893 (1957), affd. (6th Cir. 1958) 262 F. (2d) 359, cert. den. 359 U.S. 935
(1959).
88 AFL-CIO CONST., ART. II, §4.
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tunity to nominate and vote for candidates, and an honest count of
the ballots.
Commentators are in disagreement as to the capacity of the
common law to police the electoral process in labor organizations.89
A court can undoubtedly grant effective relief against violations of
a union's own constitutions and by-laws, except where foreclosed
by doctrinal rulings requiring the violation of a property right,
but it would be hard for the court to supervise elections and
virtually impossible to supply the minimum electoral guarantees
if they were missing from the union's constitution.
The LMRDA establishes comprehensive requirements for the
conduct of union elections. Local officers must be elected every
three years or oftener by secret ballot of the members or by a convention chosen by secret ballot. 90 International officers must be
elected every five years or oftener by a secret ballot of the members
or by a convention of delegates chosen by secret ballot.91 Officers
of bodies intermediate between the local and the international
must be elected not less often than every four years but the choice
may be made by other union officers.92 Probably the election provisions are inapplicable to bodies made up of representatives from
several different unions not affiliated with the same international
union - the building and construction trades councils, for
example. These organizations, although they engage in collective
bargaining, are neither international unions nor local unions,
which were the terms of art used in the Kennedy bills.93 The word
"organization" was later substituted for "union" throughout the
bill as part of a purely formal change of phraseology. The regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor are silent upon the question.
The LMRDA also guarantees the right to nominate and support candidates, to run for office, to get written notice of the election, and to vote without "improper interference or reprisal of any
kind." 94 Every member is guaranteed one vote, a provision which
not only invalidates the practice of limiting the vote to a special
class of members but which also assures apprentices and even employers a voice in the selection of the officers of any labor organiza89 Compare Wellington, "Union Democracy and Fair Representation," 67 YALE L.J.
1327 at 1347-1349 (1958), with Cox, "The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy,"
72 HARv. L. REv. 609 at 624-629 (1959).
90 Section 401 (b).
91 Section 401 (a).
92 Section 401 (d).
93 S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st sess., §301 (1959).
94 Section 401 (e).
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tion to which they may belong.95 The statute attempts to preserve
the integrity of the election by giving each candidate the right to
have an observer at the polls and the counting of the ballots. In
international elections the results of the balloting must be published separately for each local union. 96 The division of sentiment
in a single local is usually well enough known to its members to
reveal any serious dishonesty in counting the ballots provided that
the figures are not concealed by lumping them into a single total
with the results in other local unions. Compliance with the union's
constitution and by-laws is made a statutory obligation in order that
the federal remedy may be available for violations.97
To prevent union officials from gaining improper advantage,
section 401 (e) requires a union to distribute any candidate's campaign literature to the members at his own expense, and to refrain
from discrimination between candidates in making other facilities
available. Section 40 I (g) prohibits using union funds to promote
the candidacy of any person. The administration of the latter provision will require delicate judgments. When a union president
visits major locals on union business during the months before an
election, he is not unmindful of his political fences. The international representative who goes to another city to handle grievances may be expected to discuss an impending election. The incumbents invariably command more space in the union newspaper
than the opposition. Legislation can no more wipe out these advantages than it can prevent a President's dramatic move toward
world peace from aiding his campaign for reelection. The statute
obviously forbids such grossly unfair tactics as hiring additional
organizers to campaign for the reelection of incumbent officials or
using the union treasury to send out election propaganda.
The demand that all candidates be given access to the union's
membership lists produced sharp debate in Congress because two
irreconcilable principles were at stake. Since a candidate seeking
to defeat the incumbents would be hampered by the lack of a voting list, access to membership lists became a symbol of truly democratic elections in the eyes of those congressmen who would not
count it a loss if labor unions were damaged in the process. On the
other hand, the unions attach great importance to the secrecy of
their membership lists because employers, rival unions and subversive organizations have often sought to obtain lists for improper
95 See pp.
96 Section
97 Section

833-834 supra.
401 (e).
401 (e) and (f).
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purposes. Under present conditions the need for secrecy is probably
exaggerated, but one friendly to the labor movement could hardly
ignore the strength of the tradition or the force of experience even
though he was also driven to acknowledge that the preservation of
secrecy diminished the fairness of the election. In the end a compromise was reached which gives a candidate the right to inspect a
list of members who are employed under union security contracts,
once within thirty days of the election and ·without copying the
lists. This limited privilege can hardly be abused. 98
Enforcement of the election requirements is vested in the Secretary of Labor. A member desiring to challenge an election must
first invoke his remedies within the organization. After they are
exhausted or if three months elapse without a decision, he may file
a complaint with the Secretary who, upon investigation, will either
dismiss the complaint or file an action in the federal court to set
aside the election. The complaint is to be upheld only if it appears
that the violation of the statute "may have affected the outcome of
an election."99 It would be wasteful to set aside an election for
violations which could not have affected the result but obviously
proof that the outcome would have been different is not required.
If an election is set aside, the Secretary is to conduct a new election.100 An appeal may be taken from a court order directing an
election, but in the interests of expedition there may be no stay
pending the appeal.101 In order to preserve continuity in the
management of union affairs and discourage "strike suits" the
statute creates a presumption of the validity of an election until a
final judicial decision.
The foregoing provisions seem adequate to guarantee free and
fair union elections. They descend too far into detail, impairing
the ideal of self-government, but there is no requirement which
can seriously hamper a union's normal functioning. Only the
requirement of individual notice of elections on stated occasions
can be criticized as expensive,1° 2 and the cost is certainly no more
than ten cents a member for each election.
Section 403 provides careful and apparently sound rules concerning the relation between state and federal law. State regulation of union elections is barred in the interest of uniformity.
98 Section
99 Section

lOOlbid.

401 (c).
402 (c).

101 Section 402 (d).
102 Section 401 (e).
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International and national unions operate in many states. It would
be confusing, unduly burdensome, and often impossible for them
to comply with a variety of election laws. No corporation is subject to such burdens in the election of its officers. The same considerations apply with lesser force to local unions. A considerable
number function in several states. The burden of checking compliance is likely to fall upon the international union. It is also
easier to enforce one uniform rule than a crazy-quilt of state legislation. Finally, ill-considered state laws would interfere with the
national labor policy. Too stringent laws would handicap unions
in dealing with employers. Too frequent elections might result
in union instability. A comparatively stable leadership can devote
itself to constructive action thereby serving both employees and the
public.
Since these considerations do not apply to a suit to enforce a
union's own constitution or by-laws, section 403 preserves state
remedies prior to an election. A proceeding to challenge an election already conducted should bind all interested persons; consequently the statutory remedy is made exclusive.
C.

International Trusteeships

The constitutions of many international unions authorize the
international officers to suspend the normal government of a constituent local union, assume control of its property, and conduct
its affairs. The guiding standard is usually vague. For example,
the constitution of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees provides
that the General President may appoint a trustee if he "decides that
any of the officers of a local union are dishonest or grossly incompetent or that the organization is not being conducted for the best
interests of the Local and International."103
It needs no argument to demonstrate that placing a local union
in trusteeship involves serious impairment of both liberty and selfgovernment. Thereafter all decisions affecting the local are made
by officials appointed by the international. The local officers are
suspended. There are no new local elections. The members can
hold no meetings unless the trustee approves. Often the members
lose even the power to choose delegates to international conventions, thus becoming unable to influence the policies of the international or the conduct of its affairs. It seems probable, moreover,
that the threat of imposing a trusteeship is often an effective way
103 Mixed Local of Hotel Employees v. Hotel Employees, 212 Minn. 587 at 590, n. 2,
4 N.W. (2d) 771 (1942).
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to compel a local union to conform to instructions of the international officers which are contrary to the desires of the members.
Nevertheless, any thoughtful discussion of union trusteeships
must recognize their indispensability. Trusteeships are one device,
perhaps the primary device, by which international officers can
keep the labor movement strong and effective, untainted by corruption, and free from subversion. In his testimony before a Senate subcommittee AFL-CIO President Meany noted that a trusteeship may be necessary to bring about the honest administration of
local-union funds, or to restore freedom and democracy within a
local union. "[O]ccasionally a local union officer or business agent
secures complete control over the local, and becomes a virtual dictator. He may fail to call membership meetings, hold no elections,
and simply run the union to suit himself."104 Third, Mr. Meany
said that a trusteeship may be a means to free a subordinate body
from racketeers or Communist control.1°5
Two other situations might be added to this list. One is that
occasionally local officers act irresponsibly in collective bargaining
or lose control over the members. The calling of unauthorized
strikes in violation of the international's constitution or the inability or unwillingness to honor collective-bargaining commitments is a proper cause for international intervention.106 Second,
if a union becomes so torn by dissent that its business is paralyzed,
or if its local officers and members become too lazy to service existing contracts or organize non-union firms, the suspension of local
autonomy may be the only way to rebuild an effective local organization.
Unfortunately trusteeships have also been a virulent source of
political autocracy and financial corruption. Some of the most
notorious are familiar to every student of labor history. It seems
reasonable to infer from several reported cases that thousands of
dollars were extracted from laborers and contractors in the building of the Delaware River Aqueduct through the activities of
Bove, Nuzzo, and their associates, with the connivance, if not support, of the international officers of the Hod Carriers Union.107
104 Hearings on Union Financial and Administrative Practices and Procedures Before
the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 85th
Cong., 2d sess., 64 (1958).
105 Ibid.
106 Cromwell v. Morrin, 91 N.Y.S. (2d) 176 (1949).
107 See Canfield v. Moreschi, 268 App. Div. 64, 48 N.Y.S. (2d) 668 (1944), affd. 294 N.Y.
632, 64 N.E. (2d) 177 (1945); Moore v. Moreschi, 179 Misc. 475, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 208 (1942),
affd. 265 App. Div. 989, 40 N.Y.S. (2d) 334, modified 291 N.Y. 81, 50 N.E. (2d) 552 (1943);
Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 882 (1941), modified 263 App. Div. 59, 31
N.Y.S. (2d) 849 (1941).
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The autocratic direction of the United Mine Workers results at
least in part from the suspension of local self-government. Twelve
local unions of the International Union of Operating Engineers,
representing about twenty percent of the membership, were held
under international supervision; seven were held in trusteeship for
at least ten years and two for twenty-nine years.108 The McClellan
Committee also found that thirteen percent of all the locals in the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters were under trusteeships;
some of them were taken over more than fifteen years ago.109 No
one should suppose that these faults were characteristic of the labor
movement but they were nevertheless cause for great public
concern.
There appear to have been four chief motivations for the imposition of improper trusteeships.
(1) The opportunity to loot rich local treasuries has been a
significant temptation.11°
(2) The desire to control the policies of a local union may
stem from honorable motives but in a good many cases there has
been evidence of a desire to use union position for personal advantage.111
(3) Other trusteeships have been imposed in order to keep
in office men friendly to the international union.112
(4) The imposition of a trusteeship may be a method of controlling an international convention. Frequently the trustee appointed the delegates of the local union under his control. Since
the General President would name a trustee friendly to himself,
the trustee could be expected to follow the president's suggestions
in choosing delegates, and the delegates themselves would not be
blind to their dependence upon the president's good will. With ten
or twenty percent of the membership in trusteeships the international officers had a strong bloc of votes.
There is little indication that the courts afford local-union
members adequate protection against abuse of the trusteeship de108 S.

Rep. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 371 (1958).
at 448.
110 See cases cited note 107 supra.
111 This statement is based upon a number of trusteeships described in the McClellan
Committee hearings. S. Rep. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 447, passim (1958).
112 For example it is reported that when the Teamster's Local in Pontiac, Michigan
revolted against domination by four officials accused of extortion, the International named
Hoffa as trustee and he reappointed two as business agents.

100 Id.
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vice. The courts are governed chiefly by implications of the doctrine that the constitution and by-laws of a voluntary association
are a contract between the association and the members. Trustees
designated by an international union will be enjoined from interfering with the property of a local if the international officers
failed to follow constitutional procedures.U 3 Furthermore the rule
seems to be settled, again by analogy to cases dealing with the discipline of individual members, that receivers may not be appointed
to take over a local unless there is a fair hearing including notice
of the charges and an opportunity to present a defense.11 4 Not only
are there very few reported decisions staying or upsetting trusteeships upon substantive grounds but there is also pragmatic evidence
of the inability of the common law to grant local-union members
adequate protection against unjust trusteeships. For example,
Hoffa was recently trustee of seventeen different locals.11 5 Some
Teamsters locals have been under trusteeship for fifteen years.116
Perhaps such facts evidence only an indifference to self-government
so long as the union officialdom proves reasonably efficient in
securing higher wages for the members, but it seems more likely
that the explanation lies in the practical impediments to utilizing
what little theoretical protection the common law affords. The
cost of legal proceedings is likely to be heavy. Even if the suit is
successful, the individual members will reap no monetary advantage. Occasionally a group of members may feel strongly enough to
institute an action in order to protect what they feel are intangible
rights, but most men would not regard this as a sufficient inducement for risking financial loss. The individual member who institutes an action against international officers runs considerable risk
of reprisal and the more arbitrary the imposition of the trusteeship
the greater are the risks imposed.
The LMRDA remedies most of these defects. Section 301 requires periodic reports to the Secretary of Labor concerning an
international trusteeship. Section 302 establishes two standards
for testing the legality of a trusteeship.
113 Canfield v. Moreschi, 268 App. Div. 64, 48 N.Y.S. (2d) 668 (1944), affd. 294 N.Y.
632, 64 N.E. (2d) 177 (1945).
114 See Local 373, Intl. Assn. of Bridge Ironworkers v. Intl. Assn. of Bridge Ironworkers,
120 N.J. Eq. 220 at 230, 184 A. 531 (1936); Neal v. Hutcheson, 160 N.Y.S. 1007 at 1010
(1916).
115 S. Rep. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 448 (1958).
116Ibid.
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(1) The trusteeship must conform to the constitution and bylaws of the labor organization.
(2) It may be imposed only for the purpose of "correcting
corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the performance of
collective bargaining agreements or other duties of a bargaining
representative, . . . or otherwise carrying out the legitimate
objects [of the international union] . . . ."
These standards are somewhat general, especially the last, but
this is an area in which it is very difficult to find abstract criteria by
which to separate measures essential to strong internal government
from subterfuges which are oppressive or corrupt. On the other
hand, these standards should not be difficult to follow in any particular case after the facts are developed- certainly no more difficult than to decide what is an unreasonable restraint of trade or an
unfair method of competition.
Section 304 attempts to supply a guideline for determining
whether a receivership meets the statutory standard. Recognizing
the delicate judgments which international officers are called upon
to make in imposing a trusteeship and conscious of the relative inexpertness of outsiders, it provides that for the first eighteen
months a trusteeship "shall be presumed valid . . . and shall not
be subject to attack . . . except upon proof that the trusteeship
was not established in good faith for a purpose allowable under
section 301."117
The burden of showing lack of good faith is heavy, yet the
possibility permits the invalidation of those receiverships which
are shown to be only a subterfuge for an improper purpose. The
presumption is available, however, only if the trusteeship is instituted in procedural conformity with the constitution and bylaws of the international labor organization and "authorized or
ratified by its executive board after a fair hearing." The language
adopts the view that the rush of events may force the international
president to act without a hearing and therefore permits him to
hold the hearing after the trustee has been appointed. The desire
to gain the benefit of the presumption should be enough to induce
a union to allow a hearing at least after the trustee's appointment.118
117 S. 3454, 85th Cong., 2d sess., §203 (c)

(1958).
provision for ratification is included because a General President must some•
times move rapidly in order to halt financial mismanagement or corruption.
11s The
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The obnoxious element in trusteeships is their duration. The
initial suspension of local self-government is usually justified by
the needs of the organization, and it would unreasonably impair
the independence of the labor movement to allow much scope at
this point for the government to review the judgment of union
officials as to the needs of the organization or the best means of
effectuating them. On the other hand, the local emergency which
justifies international intervention can normally be resolved in a
relatively short period of time. There was some temptation, therefore, to fix a rigid statutory limit on the duration of trusteeships.
Upon more careful analysis the dangers of any arbitrary time limit
seemed clear. If Communists capture a local union, it may be more
than eighteen months before the international officers can build up
a group of loyal trade unionists able and willing to govern their
own affairs despite skilled subversion. Unhappily the entire
leadership of a local may be corrupt and its ouster may leave a
vacuum which is not easily filled. Some flexibility is therefore
required.
The LMRDA attempts to solve this problem by reversing the
presumption which applies during the first eighteen months. Section 304 (c) provides that "[a]fter the expiration of eighteen
months the trusteeship shall be presumed invalid unless the labor
organization [concerned] shall show by clear and convincing proof
that the continuation of the trusteeship is necessary for a purpose
allowable under section 302." If a trusteeship is needed for more
than eighteen months, surely the international officers ought to be
able to demonstrate the reason.
The new law also deals with two specific abuses often incident
to trusteeships. Section 303 makes it a crime to transfer to the
international union any funds of the local except the normal per
capita tax and assessments payable by subordinate bodies not in
trusteeship. This provision prevents the appointment of trustees
for the purpose of "milking" a local treasury. The same section
makes it unlawful to count votes of convention delegates designated
to represent a local union held in receivership unless the delegates
were elected by secret ballot in a general vote of the membership.
This provision prevents the use of trusteeships to control the choice
of delegates to an international convention.
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CONCLUSION

The ultimate impact of the LMRDA cannot be foretold. As
·with any new legislation experience may well demonstrate that
revisions are required. The legislation contains more than its share
of problems for judicial interpretation because much of the bill
was written on the floor of the Senate or House of Representatives
and because many sections contain calculated ambiguities or
political compromises essential to secure a majority. Consequently,
in resolving them the courts would be well advised to seek out the
underlying rationale without placing great emphasis upon close
construction of the words.
The new statute makes a number of contributions to the longrange development of labor law.
(1) The act is the first major step in the regulation of the
internal affairs of labor unions. It expands the national labor
policy into the area of relations between the employees and the
labor union. Previously national policy was confined to relationships between management and union.
(2) The enactment of a federal statute dealing with the internal affairs of labor organizations commits us to the national
development of all aspects of labor policy. The LMRDA reaches
even farther out from interstate transportation of goods than the
NLRA, although it would seem plain that there is power under the
commerce clause to prevent collective bargaining representatives
designated under the RLA and NLRA from abusing their authority. If the federal government had not moved into this field, state
legislation might have been enacted. The passage of federal legislation relieved the pressure; it also makes further state action
unlikely. This is a vast expansion of federal responsibility.
(3) The effectiveness of the new law will depend largely
upon the initiative and energy of union members. Apart from the
election and receivership provisions, which can be enforced by the
Secretary of Labor upon receipt of a complaint from an individual
member, the LMRDA relies primarily upon individual employees
to enforce the duties of union officials by intelligent voting or
private suits.
Many conscientious labor leaders and their legal advisers fear
that the act will result in a rash of burdensome litigation, some
financed by employers despite the statutory prohibition, which
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will waste the unions' resources and hamper their normal activities. On the other hand, there is the danger, often expressed in the
past, that individual employee's suits are neither an effective
sanction nor a practical remedy. Workers are unfamiliar with the
law and hesitate to become involved in legal proceedings. The cost
is likely to be heavy, and they have little money with which to post
bonds, pay lawyer's fees and print voluminous records. Time is
always on the side of the defendant. Even if the suit is successful,
there are relatively few situations in which the plaintiff or his attorney can reap financial advantage. Most men are reluctant to
incur financial cost in order to vindicate intangible rights. Individual workers who sue union officers run enormous risks, for
there are many ways, legal as well as illegal, by which entrenched
officials can "take care of" recalcitrant members.
Only time can resolve the uncertainty. Although the LMRDA
creates few rights of action which did not exist at common law,
their codification in highly-publicized legislation will bring them
to the attention of union members and their lawyers and, for a
time at least, will both facilitate the litigation and reduce the fear
of reprisals. Judges can be expected to respond to public and
congressional opinion. Nevertheless, experience suggests that in
the long run the volume of litigation is to be quite small. Only
two reported decisions involve suits for an accounting for alleged
breach of an agent's fiduciary obligations. Despite all the publicity,
the large sums at stake and the evidence developed by the McClellan Committee, there have been few actions against the Becks,
Hoffas, Brewsters and Webers. A hundred-fold increase in the
volume of litigation would not harm the labor movement. One
of the proper costs of coming-of-age is the risk of unjustified litigation; the risk of unwarranted suits is the price we pay for assurance that every man will have his day in court.
In conclusion, we should recognize that the law cannot compel
idealism or create the spirit of self-government. It cannot force
union members to attend meetings or hold their officers to a strict
accounting. Many of the intellectuals who grew up under the New
Deal may have allowed a romantic glow which surrounded the
unionism of the 1930's to obscure harsher facts, but I cannot believe
that they were entirely wrong in sensing a vitality which had something quite different to offer than wealth and power for union
officials and more and more monetary benefits for union members.
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The prestige of labor unions is at a low ebb today partly because of
the tremendous propaganda advantages gained by hostile forces
as a result of the cynical wrongdoing of a few union leaders. But it
is also attributable to their obscuring the basic idealism within the
labor movement.

